Abstract-Over the last few decades, Cluster Based Wireless Sensor Networks (CBWSNs) have played a crucial role in handling the various challenges (load balancing, routing, network lifetime etc.) of large scale Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs). However, the security becomes a big problem for CBWSNs, especially when nodes in the cluster become selfish from the intention to save their limited resources. This may even destroy the cluster. Thus a way to guarantee the security and consistent clusters is needed for proper working of CBWSNs. This paper proposes a new idea of incorporating two special nodes, Cluster Head (CH) and Inspector Node (IN) that work in a specific way, and adopts the reputation scheme to restrain selfishness of nodes in the whole cluster. The IN overhears CH's transmission in order to prevent the selfishness attack, while CH randomly checks IN to ascertain its status. A reputation scheme can further improve the security of clusters. We claim that this proposed solution not only provides security against the selfishness attack (passive attack) but also controls the black hole attack (active attack), thus providing more consistent clusters for CBWSNs sustainability. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed approach is also effective in packet drop control and throughput improvement.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have gained a lot of attraction not only from the research community, but also from common people due to its vital role in general life. Its application range is very wide. It can be divided into two big categories, i.e. tracking and monitoring, which further include military, habitat, health, business, public, industrial and environmental. In order to accomplish these missions, WSNs can be seen in different forms nowadays, i.e., terrestrial, underground, underwater and multimedia WSNs. Nodes in WSNs are usually scattered in the ad hoc manner over the area of interest either using some infrastructure or totally infrastructure less. Sensor nodes have the ability to sense and collect data and send to the sink node via multihop routes [1, 2] .
According to the recent development and deployment challenges in this technology, node clustering was considered vital for this technology. The clustering is helpful for scalability and network lifetime extension. It has been proven as an effective approach to organize a network into a connected hierarchy [3, 4, 5] .
From the security point of view, it is very important to construct the cluster carefully in WSNs paradigm. The limited resources of nodes and ad hoc nature of WSNs can create problems for cluster in the form of selfishness attack (passive attack) [6, 7, 8] . The selfishness and the non cooperative nature of nodes in WSN and MANET can badly affect their functionality [9, 10, 11] .
Our basic motivation is to mitigate the selfishness problem in CBWSNs, because a selfish cluster head can destroy the whole cluster. This selfishness problem prompted us to propose an enhancement for existing clustering techniques to provide security against this inside attack. The main design of our proposed security framework is to appoint two special nodes per cluster: inspector node and cluster head node. The resulting cluster, then basically consists of three types of nodes, i.e., Cluster Head (CH), Inspector Node (IN), and Member Nodes (MNs); and they are one hop away from CH as shown in Fig. 1 . In order to control the selfishness attack, these nodes act in a specific way and an additional security is provided by using a reputation system at each node, because trust and reputation schemes can play an important role in the security of wireless communication nowadays [12, 13, 14, 15] .
The IN exploits packet overhearing phenomena, which is one of characteristics of wireless communication and used by many previous researches to provide security against the selfishness attack [16, 17] . If an IN finds some problems in overhearing CH's transmission, then it blacklists the CH and also informs MNs within its range to make them stop sending data to the CH. However, the MNs also can refuse the IN's decision if they judge, based on their own reputation system, it might be a deliberate accusation by the IN.
Meanwhile, CH also sends random checking requests to IN, to ascertain its status, whether IN is working correctly or not. In addition, CH assigns bad reputation values to MNs, which do not take part in IN nomination for a long time to save their energy. The main responsibility of CH is to forward MNs' data to the sink node. The proposed strategy not only solves the selfishness (passive attack) but also covers the black hole attack (active attack). We also argue that the clusters using this strategy are more robust as compared to other types of clusters.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The next section reviews existing works. Section III describes the proposed solution in detail. Section IV describes the evaluation and analysis. Section V concludes this paper. 
II. RELATED WORK
We studied the state of the art clustering algorithms and the difficulties they faced while being designed in WSNs. Also, other research articles address the cluster's security, the effect of selfish behavior, the reputation schemes, the trust systems, and the overhearing phenomena in WSNs.
Younis et al. [3] mention the challenges faced by clustering algorithms inWSNs. This article focuses on whether clustering is performed in a centralized or a distributed fashion. Schaffera et al. [6] consider the importance of clusters and their security for recent applications of WSNs. This paper reviews state-of-the-art clustering protocols with special emphasis on security and reliability issues. Dong et al. [7] focus on developing a practical cluster leader election protocol that is more efficient, resilient, and effective than previous techniques. On the other hand, Thein et al. [8] put emphasis on the importance of CHs in WSNs. They propose a recovery model to increase the availability and survivability of CHs.
Yan et al. [9] describe the effect of the selfish behavior in WSNs, while Yoo et al. [10] describe the cooperation among the nodes in the Mobile Ad-hoc Network (MANET) and problems created from the selfish behavior of nodes during this cooperation. Mostly routing in MANETs might be badly affected by this phenomena.
A number of reputation and trust mechanisms have been suggested and studied in order to control the selfishness of nodes in one way or another in wireless ad hoc paradigm. Yoo et al. [11] propose a load balancing approach called Simple Load Balancing Approach (SLBA) and a reward scheme, Protocol-Independent Fairness Algorithm (PIFA), to uniformly distribute the traffic and prevent the performance degradation caused by the selfishness of nodes in MANET. Yu et al. [13] also describe and show the importance of a trusted system and a reputation scheme for the wireless communication nowadays. Resnick and Zeckhauser [15] suggest a reputation system that can make a distinction between a trustworthy and untrustworthy nodes and encourage trustworthiness.
An important feature of wireless communication is that a node can overhear transmitting packets in the neighborhood. The overhearing has been widely used by many previous researchers, including Paek et al. [16] , who suggest an overhearing-based detection mechanism (OBD) to detect the occurrence of malicious packet-modifying attacks (MPA).
III. PROPOSED SOLUTION
We propose a new security framework for CBWSNs against the selfishness attack by the resource limited sensor nodes. This innovative strategy consists of three levels as shown in Fig. 2 , and each level has an important role to fight against the selfishness problem in its own way. The first level shows the uniqueness of clustering process, which incorporates two special nodes per cluster: A head node and an inspector node. The clustering process is carried out in two rounds and the resulting clusters topology consists of basically three types of nodes, i.e., Cluster Head (CH), Inspector Node (IN), and Member Nodes (MNs) as shown in Fig. 1 . On the other hand, the second level depicts the role of the reputation scheme contributing to the other two levels and the third level reveals specific operations at CH, IN, and MNs beside their usual activities. Our approach mainly targets the passive attack (selfishness) in the clusters, but, additionally it can also resolve the black hole attack which is a kind of active attacks. In this way, we can say that adopting this proposed idea in the cluster formation process can make clusters safe from the danger of the selfishness problem. The levels of the proposed security framework will be elaborated one by one in the following sections. 
A. Level 1: Uniqueness of Clustering
The proposed cluster formation process is carried out in two rounds in a distributed manner. In the first round, a node that wants to be a cluster head, broadcasts a request to its one-hop neighbors. The neighbor's replies depend on their previous experience with the node. The proposed cluster formation process is carried out in two rounds in a distributed manner. If the number of replies satisfies a specific threshold value, for example, Ts, it is over 70 percent of the total neighbor replies, then it can consider itself as the cluster head and all replying neighbor nodes become the MNs of the cluster. In the second round, CH requests only its neighbor MNs to volunteer for the inspector node (IN) role, since IN must be within the communication range of CH to overhear its transmission. The volunteer MNs send back replies to CH. Waiting for the MN replies for a specific time duration, CH randomly picks one of them to complete the second round. This whole process is observed in Fig. 3 and Fig.  4 . 
1) Design Issue: Why clustering using two rounds instead of one round?
The debate is, why using two rounds instead of one? In order to find the selfishness attack by CH, the proposed method requires IN to be one hop away or within the range of CH to perform overhearing function consistently. However, if sensor nodes that want to be CH and IN present themselves in the same round, there is a chance for the two selected nodes to be out of the range of each other. This contradicts with the requirement that CH and IN must be the direct neighbor of each other. This situation is illustrated in Fig. 5 . 
B. Level 2: Reputation System
The previous research in the security domain revealed that the inside attacks by the authorized nodes are far more difficult to be controlled than the outside attacks by the unauthorized nodes. The selfishness attack is one of critical inside attacks. Many researchers have suggested incentive schemes to resolve the selfishness attack, that is to encourage nodes to be honest by giving some profits when they participate in a cooperative environment (e.g., MANETs) [10] [11] [12] . On the contrary, the reputation and trust systems prevent the selfishness by giving penalties to nodes with bad reputation, for instance, the exclusion from the network. These reputation systems are useful for any system to avoid being a victim of inside attacks [13] [15].
In the proposed method, we incorporate the reputation system at sensor nodes to control the damage of the selfishness attack at different levels. The reputation system at each node calculates reputation values of its neighbor nodes according to their cooperation in data forwarding activities and uses it later in the clustering process in the CH selection process. In our method, clustering results in the network with three types of nodes, i.e., CH, IN, and MNs as shown in Fig. 1 . The neighbor types of each node may be a little different depending on its role in the cluster, which are listed in Table 1 and can be observed in Fig. 1 .
The reputation schemes maintain reputation history as well as work in a little bit different way depending on the new role of nodes. First, CH can assign reputation values for IN, MNs, and immediate CHs and Gateway Nodes (GNs), to whom it can forward its data, if it is not a direct neighbor of the sink node. It can assign good or bad reputation to IN depending on its response to random checking process and can evaluate the reputation of MNs based on their participation in IN election process, and the neighbor CHs and Gateway Node (GN) can get reputation based on their response to CH's data forwarding request. Among these immediate CHs and GNs, CH can choose one that has a good reputation as well as convenient on the forwarding path to the sink node. As shown in Fig. 1 , the third cluster, there are two gateway nodes, i.e. GN1 and GN2. The CH has the option to choose between them. It chooses GN2, because it has a good reputation and is convenient to forward the packets to the next cluster properly.
Second, IN's can compute good or bad reputation for CH depends on its data forwarding on behalf of its MNs, means it is properly overhears its transmission or not.
Lastly, MNs can assign good or bad reputation to CH, if, its data are delivered to the destination properly or not. In this situation, when IN accuse the CH selfishness to MNs, MN can take their own decision whether it really assigns bad reputation to the IN or not. In this way we can say that MNs can assign reputation to IN according to its working. 
1) Deliberate Accusation Issue
It is expected that there are two types of deliberate accusation might be possible. i.e.,
a) Active Deliberate Accusation
IN can purposely accuse CH though it is working honestly. In this situation the MNs can play a vital role and they can take their own decision based on their reputation value for the CH and stop this deliberate accusation scenario from occurring by giving bad reputation value to IN and also notify it to CH. CH will take further action to select the new IN.
b) Passive Deliberate Accusation
It is indirect accusation phenomena made by either neighbors of a MN that want to be CH during the cluster formation or MNs that do not want to be a candidate for the IN role. In the former case, this accusation can badly affect the CH selection process. Clustering either take a long time to complete or even may be failed. In order to tolerate this situation, we use a specific threshold Ts, the limit for the number of replies from neighbors, as already described in the cluster formation process that considered enough for selection of CH: Then the node is acceptable as CH. In the latter scenario, CH can take action against these types of nodes by assigning them bad reputation values. If it observes the situation that some MNs do not present their self for an IN role for a long time then it assigns them bad reputation values. In this way we can say that the reputation scheme can help in controlling deliberate accusation and make the clustering process consistent and reliable.
C. Level 3: Specific Operations at Nodes 1) Inspector Node (IN) a) Transmission overhearing
As the basic function of CH is to forward the packets on behalf of MNs, the selfishness of CH is very dangerous to the cluster, even destroying the whole cluster. In order to avoid this situation from occurring the IN can play a vital role. Overhearing CH activities, if the IN observes CH not forward more than a fixed number of packets, it sends an accusation message to MNs in the same cluster to induce them to blacklist CH. If any node is blacklisted on the reputation system of others, they refuse the cooperation with the node and even exclude it from the network. The workflow of IN is given in Fig. 6 
b) Response to the Random Checking by CH
As shown in Fig. 7 , IN keeps the transmission overhearing history in order to satisfy the random checks made by CH in order to ensure the IN status that either it is working well or not. IN removes all previous history after satisfying each random checking request and starts to keep the overhearing history again to satisfy the next random checking request. Fig. 7 (a) and (b) illustrates the IN's process to respond to CH's random checking request and the restarting of the reputation system to keep the overhearing history to satisfy the next random checking request from CH. In this way, IN can be refrained from becoming selfish during its working. 
2) Cluster Head (CH)
The CH also has to handle the selfishness of others. As mentioned earlier, all nodes in the network should actively take the role of CH or IN for normal operation of the entire network, although the role requires more energy consumed. This is why nodes not playing a role of CH or IN for a long time are blacklisted on a reputation system. However, a node may avoid this obligation easily by not doing the IN's operation the overhearing on the CH after being elected as IN. In other words, it just pretends to work as IN, becoming a free rider.
As time grows, the ratio of dishonest INs may increase, thus CH can have much room to behave selfishly without receiving any penalty. To prevent this situation, we make CH to check IN by requesting a specific packet randomly the IN has overheard. If, the IN has been working honestly, it replies with the correct material. Since the IN cannot know in advance which packet will be requested, it cannot cheat the CH random checking process. In case of any malfunctioning of IN, CH enforcing IN to be honest during its working, otherwise blacklist it by assigning bad reputation as shown in Fig. 8 . 
3) Member Nodes (MNs)
All sensor nodes have a reputation system to enhance the cooperation of their neighbors. MNs evaluate the reputation of CH and IN. A MN assigns reputation to CH that is proportional to the rate of its packets being delivered successfully. On the other hand, is assigned bad reputation if the IN makes a decision opposite to its own reputation system. For example, if an IN accuses a CH, but a MN can judge the CH as a cooperative node based on its own reputation system, the IN is regarded as a deliberate accuser, being assigned bad reputation by the MN. On the contrary, if an IN does not accuse a CH even though a lot of packets are not delivered to the sink node, a MN considers the IN as a selfish node.
IV. EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS
To evaluate the performance of the proposed security framework, we used the Matlab simulator. The simulation environment consists of 100 nodes in the range of 1000m*1000m. The nodes were deployed randomly over an area of interest. The performance of the proposed security framework was evaluated in terms of throughput and packet dropping ratio. The graphs are averages of 10 runs and we assume a different ratio of selfish node existence in the network for each run. In Fig. 9 , we can see that with the increase of the selfish node ratio the number of dropped packets increases simultaneously. We can see that without using the proposed solution the number of dropped packets in the presence of 50 % selfish nodes in the network are 27 packets, while it is remain only 12 after utilizing the proposed solution. In Fig. 10 the throughput improvement of our proposed security framework can be seen. There is a clear difference in the throughput of the CBWSNs before and after utilizing the proposed solution. This shows that before and after using the proposed solution at 50 % selfish node existence in CBWSNs the throughput value is 0.65 and 0.78. As a side benefit, the proposed method is also effective against a kind of active attack, the black hole attack, as shown in Fig. 11 . The black hole attack is a type of Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. It occurs when an attacker captures and reprograms a set of nodes in the network to block the packets they receive instead of forwarding them towards the base station. As a result, any information that enters in the black hole region is captured. The black hole attacks are easy to constitute and they are capable of undermining network effectiveness by partitioning the network, such that important event information does not reach the base stations. [18] .
In Fig. 11 we can inspect that in the proposed cluster when the CH becomes selfish or compromised, then it starts to drop packets and not forward to the base station leading to a black hole attack scenario. We argue that this type of situation can be detected and easily controlled by the overhearing phenomena of IN in the proposed security framework. Thus we can say that proposed security framework can not only control the selfishness attack, but also effective against the black hole attack. In order to solve the security problems of CBWSNs, we proposed a new security framework to provide security to clusters in presence of selfish nodes in the clusters. The specialty of this proposed strategy is due to the integration of two special nodes (CH and IN) per cluster, the addition of the reputation schemes and a specific way of working of these nodes to control the selfishness attack against the clusters in the CBWSNs. We claim that this proposed idea can improve the CBWSNs efficiency by having the more consistent and resilient clusters by controlling the selfishness attack. This proposed scheme is not only effective to control the selfishness attack (passive attack), but also useful to control the black hole attack (active attack). In the future we want to extend the idea to the IoT domain by considering the smartness of the objects and incorporating data mining algorithms to analyze the behavior of nodes to successfully identify the intruders in the form of selfishness attacks.
